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PATENTABILITY OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED LIFE-FORMS: LEGAL
ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS
In the latter part of the 20th century man has made substantial
inroads in his understanding and ultimate control of the natural,
physical and life sciences. For example, in the year 1902 man had
not yet perfected flight;' by 1969 he had walked on the moon.2 Despite the magnitude of the hurdles which our scientists overcome,
the technical obstacles seem easier to deal with than the sociological
and ethical issues created by the newfound technologies. In no single endeavor of human ingenuity is this more profoundly illustrated
than in the field of genetic engineering.
In addition to the ethical and moral questions 3 which we now
must face, our lawmakers must also face the legal issues emanating
from the patentability of higher life forms. 4 As is usually the case,
legal theory has lagged behind onrushing reality. At present,
1. 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA, TRANSPORTATION 828 (1988). At 10:35
A.M.,on December 17,1903, Orville Wright successfully took off in a powered,
heavier-than-air airplane.

2. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BrrANNicA, EXPLORATION 51 (1988). On July 20,
1969, at 2:56 A.M. GMT Neil Armstrong became the first man to step onto the
moon's surface.
3. To some, including religious groups and environmental activists, the
thought of genetically engineered animals is detestable. They picture an uncontrolled technology gone awry, with the sanctity of life being degraded by a race
for profits. See, eg., Crawford, Religious GroupsJoinAnimal PatentBattle, 237
ScI. 480 (1987). Arie R. Browner, general secretary of the National Council of
Churches states that "[t]he gift of life from god, in all its forms and species,
should not be regarded solely as if it were a chemical product, subject to genetic
alteration and patentable for economic benefit." Id at 480.
Others, as might be imagined, have disagreed. For example, to some businessmen and doctors the concept of genetic engineering is a godsend, heralding
an era of cures for infectious and hereditary diseases. See, e.g., Irwin Arieff,
U.S. GrantsPatent to GeneticallyAltered Mouse, REUTER BUSINESS REP., Apr.
12, 1988 (the genetically altered "Harvard mouse" provides researchers with a
new tool to help them develop treatments for cancer, quoting R. Godown, President of the Industrial Biotechnology Association); Mouse Paten A First,Issued to Harvard,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13 1988, at Al, col. 5 (genetically altered
mouse affords scientists a new tool to efficiently test new cancer treatments).
The genetic engineering proponents also envision an increase in food production resulting from the use of genetic engineering. See, e.g., Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve
ConstitutionalProtection?,15 AM. J.L. & IED. 461 (1989); Kevin D. DeBre,
Note, Patentson People and the U.S. Constitution:CreatingSlaves or Enslaving
Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (1989).
4. For the purposes of this comment, "higher life forms" refers to any
multicellular living organism, excluding plants.
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higher life forms are clearly patentable subject matter 5 under section 101 of the Patent Act 6 , which defines what type of inventions
are patentable7 .
However, questions remain as to the ownership of the offspring
of patented animals. Also, it is not clear as to how the requirements
of section 112,8 which mandates that an inventor describe his invention, will be fulfilled by an inventor who has genetically altered an
animal. Additionally, as the field of genetic engineering matures,
we will have to face the question of the constitutionality of a patent
covering a human or a human/non-human hybrid.9
This comment highlights some of the legal issues raised by the
emerging field of genetic engineering and suggests how the issues
may be resolved. Part I will provide a brief exposition of the genetic engineering field. Part II will explain the judicial decisions
leading up to the patentability of multicellular animals. Finally,
part III will discuss some of the novel legal issues presented by the
patentability of genetically altered life-forms, as well as analyze
some suggestions for their resolution. Part II is further divided
into three sections. The first section discusses the uncertainty regarding the ownership of the offspring of a patented farm animal.
This section concludes by suggesting appropriate legislation to remedy the uncertainty in the present law. The second section addresses a shortcoming in the Patent and Trademark Office's
("PTO") procedure for determining when a deposit of a specimen of
a genetically engineered organism must be included with a patent
application. This section proposes a modification to the PTO's procedure to remedy the fault. Finally, the third section explains how
a person's constitutionally protected right of privacy might be vio5. See in fra notes 71-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the patentability of multicellular organisms, including animals.
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1990).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 101. This section details what inventions are patentable. It
states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,

machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirement of this title." Id.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112. This section states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he specification [part of the patent application] shall contain a written description of the
invention." Id.
9. When genetic manipulation of human genes becomes feasible, scientists
will be in a position to create a human/non-human hybrid animal. Such a hybrid animal has been proposed as a possibility by Dr. J.B.S. Haldane. He has
suggested that genetic engineering might be employed to produce humans endowed with prehensile feet and no heels. Such genetically altered people would
prove to be able astronauts because such a configuration would be particularly
well suited to life in the cramped quarters and low gravity of a spaceship.
DeBre, supra note 3, at 222 n.8 (citing Haldane, Biological Possibilitiesfor
Human Species in the Next Ten Thousand Year, in MAN AND HIs FuTURE 337,
354 (G. Wolstenholme ed. 1963)).
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lated by the present patent system if that person possessed a patented gene. This section proposes appropriate legislation to
alleviate any unconstitutional violations of privacy caused by the
patent process.
I. GE=Erc ENGINEERING
Genetic engineering, or recombinant DNA ("rDNA") technology, is a term incorporating various procedures within the expansive field of biotechnology. 10 It is a process inwhich a cell's genetic
material, or DNA," can be transformed or manipulated to yield a
new life-form. 12
Scientists have at their disposal numerous methods of manipulating an organism's DNA. 13 Regardless of the exact procedure involved, however, the ensuing genetically engineered organisms are
proving to have more and more practical applications. As the developers of emerging rDNA technology begin to see the potential for
monetary rewards for their endeavors, 14 they are inevitably seeking
10. Biotechnology is a field in which living organisms are utilized in industrial or technical processes. It is an expansive field, embodying disciplines such
as applied genetics, biochemistry, chemistry, biology, microbiology, chemical engineering and industrial engineering. John M. Czarnetzky, Note, Altering Natures Blueprintsfor Profit: PatentingMulticellularAnimals, 74 VA. L. REv.

1327, 1327 n.3 (1988).
11. Deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA') in effect contains a "blueprint" of an
organism. The DNA molecules are composed of two intertwined spiral bands of
chemicals; the order of these chemicals, known as nucleotides, establishes the

characteristics of an organism. See id. at 1331.
12. Because the possible number of permutations resulting from the matching of any two DNA bands is extensive, there is considerable diversity conceivable among life forms. Id.
13. See Berge Hampar, Patenting of Recombinant DNA Technology: The
Deposit Requirement, 67 J. PAT. OFF.SoC'y 569 (1985). The exact method of

DNA manipulation utilized will depend upon the particular task. Id. at 572.
The scientist may, for example, intend to obtain large amounts of a particular
gene. Id. In this case, the gene would be separated and introduced into a strand
of DNA taken from a host cell. Id. This DNA is then spliced into the host cell
where it reproduces, using the information from the inserted gene. Id. Large
quantities of a specific gene can, thus, be made available. Id. The host cell has
acted, in effect, as a manufacturing facility for the production of the required
gene. Id.
Alternatively, a scientist may desire to produce what is known as a "transgenic" animal. Id. Janice Sharp, Comment, Note, Of Transgenic Mice and
Men, 16 W. ST. U.L.R. 737, 744 n.74 (1989). Such "transgenic" animals are produced by inserting foreign genes into the fertilized egg of the chosen animal. Id
Through normal cell division encountered during the development of the
animal, the foreign genes are propagated. Id. The characteristics of the foreign
gene can thus manifest themselves in the adult animal.
14. For example, Amgen, Inc. owns a patent on a gene used to make a drug
called erythropoietin ("EPO"). Mad Scientists, Bus. MONTH, May 1990, at 54.
EPO increases the production of red blood cells in patients afflicted with anemia. Id The drug has potential sales of $1 billion or more per year, and Amgen
has already been selling over $1.5 million worth of the drug per month. Id.
Cambridge BioScience Corp. is co-developer of a recombinant feline leukemia
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patent protection. 15
vaccine which has a worldwide market that is estimated at over $50 million
annually. P.R. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 1990.
15. In order to motivate inventors to engage in scientific research, the
United States Constitution authorizes Congress to award inventors limited monopolies on their inventions. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Constitution authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries"). In recognition of this grant of authority, Congress passed the first patent statute in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790,
ch. 7, Stat. 109. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1990).
The agency which governs the patent system is the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"). The PTO is an office "where records, books, drawings, specifications, and other papers and things pertaining to patents and to trademark
registrations shall be kept and preserved." § 1.
To obtain a patent, an inventor must file an application with the PTO.
§ 111. "Application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the
inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the Commissioner [of patents]." Id. The application must include (1) a specification as
mandated by section 112 of the Patent Act; (2) a drawing as mandated by section 113 of the Act; (3) an oath by the applicant as mandated by section 115 of
the Act; and, (4) the appropriate fees as mandated by section 41 of the Act. The
application must also include the "claims." § 112. The claims are the most critical part of a patent application. They sculpt the extent of protection to be afforded the inventor by defining the subject matter which the inventor considers
to be his invention. Id. An inventor may claim either a tangible object or a
process. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... may obtain a patent therefor"). A patent claiming a tangible object is easy to conceptualize. For example, an inventor may claim a new type of transistor. In contrast, in a process
patent, an inventor claims a process for achieving a given result, for example, a
process to heat steel.
After the inventor completes his application, the PTO examines it. § 131.
"The Commissioner shall cause an examination to be made of the application
and the alleged new invention." Id. To be granted a patent, the invention must
meet the four requirements of the Patent Act. First, the invention must be
within the scope of patentable subject matter. § 101. Patentable subject matter
includes "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." I&L Second, the invention
must be novel. § 102. Section 102 mandates that the invention be "new" in
light of the prior art; i.e., previous patents, scholarly articles, trade magazines,
etc. See id. See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-91 (1981) (examination
of the novelty of the invention itself is made with reference to section 102, not
101). Third, the invention must be useful. § 101. Absence of the utility of an
invention is very rarely contested by the PTO, although the requirement has
occasionally been cited as a bar to patentability of "immoral" inventions. See R.
CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 375 (3d ed. 1987). Fourth, the
invention must be nonobvious. § 103. A patent cannot be granted by the PTO
"if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." Id.
In addition to the above requirements the invention must meet, the application itself must conform to certain requirements. First, the application must
describe the elements of the invention. § 112. The description must be "in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
the same." Id. Also, the application must meet the "enablement" requirement
by disclosing the best method of making and using the invention. § 112. "The
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JuDIcIAL DECISIONS LEADING TO THE PATENTABILITY OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MULTICELLULAR ORGANISMS

16
A. Patentabilityof Living Organisms Before Chakrabarty

The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has historically is17
sued process patents on inventions that utilized living organisms.
These patents claimed a process utilizing a living organism, not the
organism itself.' s For example, there are numerous patents claiming septic tank systems which employ bacteria as part of the process
of breaking down waste. 19 Despite the acceptance by the PTO and
judicial systems of process patents involving living organisms, inventors have had much difficulty in patenting the living organisms
themselves.
specification... shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention." Id.
If the inventor's application is rejected by the examiner, the applicant may
appeal the rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 35
U.S.C. § 134. From the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences there are
two mutually exclusive routes of appeal. The first route is to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, based entirely on the record developed in the patent office. Id. at §§ 141-144. The second route is to the District Court for the
District of Columbia, based on a record which may include evidence not
presented to the patent office, if good reason is shown why it was not earlier
presented. Id. at § 145. An applicant may then appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the Supreme Court, or in the usual manner
from the District Court up to the Supreme Court. See CHOATE, supra, at 539
(citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)).
Once an application is accepted, a patent will issue to the inventor. The
term of the patent is 17 years, and begins to run from the date the patent is
issued. § 154. During the term of the patent the inventor has the exclusive
right to exclude others from making, using or selling his invention. § 271 (a).
Section 271(a) states that "whoever without authority makes, uses, or sells any
patented invention ... infringes the patent.". Id. If the patent is infringed, then
the inventor can bring a civil suit against the infringer. § 281. Section 281 states
that "a patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent". I& The patentee may seek injunctive relief to bar further infringement.
§ 283. The Act empowers a court to "grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent." Id.
Additionally, the patentee may seek damages. § 284. Section 284 states that
"the court shall award the claimant [patent holder] damages adequate to compensate for the infringement." Id.
16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
17. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th
Cir. 1934) (patent for septic tank using aerobic bacteria held valid and infringed); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932)
(patent for a bacterial process used in the synthesis of alcohol and acetone valid
and infringed); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F.
453, 462 (2d Cir. 1908) (patent claiming a septic tank using anaerobic bacteria
valid). See also Funk Bros. Seed'Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)
(the Court acknowledged that the application of a product of nature in a process
could be patentable but the bacteria in this case was not novel).
18. See supra note 15 for a discussion of process claims.
19. See supra note 17 for examples of valid septic tank patents.
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In In re Merat,20 an inventor applied for a patent on a dwarf
chicken. 21 The chicken was the result of controlled breeding, not
genetic engineering. 22 The patent examiner rejected the application2 3 because the chicken was something occurring in nature
which was produced by controlled propagation, was not a "manufacture" and was, therefore, not patentable under section 101 of the
26
25
Patent Act.24 The Board of Patent Appeals ("B.P.A.") agreed.
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A")2 affirmed the B.P.A.'s decision,2 but on other
grounds.2 Thus, the question of whether the dwarf chicken was
patentable subject matter under section 101 remained unanswered.
Two years later, the C.C.P.A. expressed an opinion on whether
non-naturally occurring microorganisms were patentable subject
matter under section 101 of the Patent Act. In In re Bergy,30 an
inventor 3l had developed a new method for producing a known antibiotic.3 2 In the process of this development, Bergy discovered a
previously unknown microorganism.-3 The examiner allowed all of
Bergy's process claims for producing the new microorganism. 34
However, the examiner rejecteds5 Bergy's claim to the microorganism itself.35 The examiner rejected the claim on the ground that
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act did
20. In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
21. Me-rat, 519 F.2d at 1391.
22. Id
23. I1&

24. Id25. The Board of Patent Appeals and the Board of Patent Interferences
were combined in 1984 into the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
Robert B. Kambic, Note, Hindering the Progressof Science: The Use of the Patent System to Regulate Research on GeneticallyAltered Animals, 16 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 441, 450 n.95 (1988).
26. In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
27. In 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was combined with

the Court of Claims to form the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See
Kambic, supra note 25, at 450 n.95.
28. Merat, 519 F.2d at 1393.
29. Id. at 1396. The C.C.P.A. rejected the patent on the ground that it failed

to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112 by failing to distinctly claim the subject matter of
the patent Id.
30. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
31. There were actually three inventors: Bergy, Coats and Malik. Ic. at 967.
The court referred to them collectively as "Bergy"; this comment will follow
the same procedure.
32. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 967.
33. Id.
34. I&
35. Id. at 972.
36. Id. at 967. The rejected claim was drawn to a biologically pure culture
of the microorganism, Stretpmyces vellosus, which produced the antibiotic
lincomycin. Id.
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not include products of nature. 37 On appeal, the C.C.P.A. decided
that non-naturally occurring microorganisms were patentable subject matter 38 .
B.

The Chakrabarty 39 Decision

It was against this backdrop that Chakrabartycame before the
United States Supreme Court.40 Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, had
filed a patent application, claiming a bacterium capable of consuming multiple components of crude oil. 4 ' Chakrabarty's bacteria
were useful for the treatment of oil spills.42 The examiner rejected
Chakrabarty's claims 43 to the genetically engineered bacteria" for
37. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 972 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
38. Id. at 975. The court stated that the objectives of the patent system required it to include microorganisms and pure cultures within the terms "manufacture and composition of matter" under section 101. Id, The court found no
reason to refuse the patent protection for these new and unobvious microorganisms and cultures. Id.
39. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
40. The Chakrabarty case and the surrounding events have been extensively critiqued and will only be discussed briefly in this comment. For more indepth coverage, see John W. Behringer, Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts?,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 883 (1980); Allen Bloom, Designer Genes and PatentLaws: A
Good Fit,26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1041 (1981); Steven A. Bent, Comment, Living
MatterFound to Be Patentable:In re Chakrabarty, 11 CONN. L. REV. 311 (197879); Frank P. Darr, Note, Expanding Patent Coverage:Policy Implications of
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 1061 (1981); Mark E. James, Note,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Living Things as Statutory Subject Matter, 1 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 119 (1980); Comment, Man-Made Organisms Receive Patent Protection: Diamond v. Charabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980), 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 261 (1981);
Reginald R. Modlin, Note, Life Forms as ProperSubject Matter Under the Patent Act Diamond v. Charabarty, 98 DET.C.L. REv. 939 (1980); Comment, The
Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C sec. 101: In re Bergy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1978); Donald W. Strickland, Note, Patentingof Life Forms
- MicroorganismsMore Akin to Inanimate Chemical Compositionsand Useful
as Industrial Tools Are Not Excluded from Categories of Patentable Subject
MatterMerely Because They Are Alive, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 242 (1978).
41. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 305. Before Chakrabarty's invention, biological management of oil spills demanded the utilization of a mixture of naturally
existing bacteria, each capable of degrading a single component of the crude oil.
Id. Through these biological means, the oil is converted into substances which
are edible by the indigenous sea life. Id. However, when a mixture of bacteria
are used in the treatment of oil spills, only a percentage of the bacteria survive
to decompose the oil. Id. Chakrabarty's single bacterium is, therefore, more
efficient in breaking down an oil spill. Id. at 305 n.2.
42. Id. Commentators have suggested that it was no coincidence that
Chakrabarty's "oil eating" bacteria were the first microorganism to be granted a
patent. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 463 n.7. Ecologically concerned groups
were among those particularly opposed to the granting of patents for living entities. Id. They voiced dismay at the prospect of scientifically transformed life
forms being introduced into the ecological chain. Id. The Patent and Trademark Office "may have had these groups in mind when it granted the first patent for an organism which would significantly increase our ability to clean up
major ocean pollution." Id.
43. The patent claims were of three types: (1) process claims for the technique of generating the bacteria; (2) claims for an inoculum including a carrier
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two reasons: first, the bacteria were unpatentable "products of na46
ture";45 second, living entities are not patentable subject matter.
Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of the claims to the Patent Office Board of Appeals ("Board"). 47 The Board affirmed the decision
on the second ground, that the bacteria were not patentable subject
matter.48 The C.C.P.A., however, reversed the Board.49 In so doing, the C.C.P.A. relied on its prior decision, In re Bergy,5° where
the court had held that the validity of a patent claim is not dependent on the fact that the claimed microorganisms are alive.51 Even52
tually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court found for Chakrabarty,5 holding that a
live, human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter.M
The Court studied the legislative history of section 101 and decided
that Congress had intended the section to be interpreted broadly.5 5
The Court stressed that patentable subject matter was to "include
anything under the sun made by man."'
The granting of
Chakrabarty's patent was a crucial event in the evolution of patent
law. The PTO's acceptance of the validity of a patent on a multicellular animal was soon to follow.
substance (i.e., straw) floating on water and the new bacteria; and (3) claims to
the bacteria itself. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). The P.T.O.
granted the claims on the process that produced the bacteria and on the inoculum, but not on the bacteria itself. Id.
44. Chakrabarty had found that plasmisds, hereditary units in the cell, influence the oil degradation capabilities of some bacteria. Id. He had perfected a
process by which numerous plasmids, each capable of degrading different oil
components, could be conveyed to and maintained in a single bacterium. Id, at
305 n.1.
45. Id. at 306.
46. Id.
47. Id,
48. Id. The Board had decided that the claimed bacteria were not "products
of nature" because such bacteria containing the essential plasmids were not naturally occurring. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
51. Id. at 1038.
52. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether section 101 includes live, human-made
microorganisms within its scope of patentable subject matter. Id. at 305.
53. Id. at 318.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 308. Chief Justice Burger wrote "the relevant legislative history
...supports a broad construction... The Act embodied Jefferson's philosophy
that 'ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement."' Id.
56. Id at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
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C. Post-ChakrabartyAnimal Patents

Despite the Chakrabarty57 decision, however, the PTO continued to reject patents on multicellular animals.58 The PTO's position was that it required explicit judicial authorization before the
Office would issue such patents.5 9 The case of Ex parteAllen 60 provided the PTO with this judicial authorization.
In 1984, Allen sought a patent on both the process 6 ' to induce
polyploidy6 2 in oysters and on the polyploid oyster itself.63 The patent examiner had approved the claim for the process of inducing
the polyploidy64 but had rejected the claims for the polyploid oyster
itself.65 The examiner rejected the claims for two reasons: (1) that
as living organisms, the oysters were outside the scope of section
101 and thus not patentable,6 and (2) that the process of creating
the oyster would have been obvious to an ordinary person skilled in
the art.67 On appeal, the Board reversed the examiner's section 101

rejection of the claims.68 The Board relied upon the Chakrabarty
holding that section 101 included within its bounds all non-natural
human-made living entities.6 9 The Board reasoned that if a human57. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

58. Jerry E. Bishop, U.S. To Allow PatentsforGenetically AlteredAnimals,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1987, § 1, at 6, col 1.

59. Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life,
cS J., Summer 1988, at 399, 403 (citing Patents and the Constitution:
TransgenicAnimals, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,100th
JURAM

Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1980)).
60. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987).
61. The inventor employed a procedure which created an alteration in the
number of chromosomes in oyster eggs, by exposing fertilized eggs to pressure
for a given length of time. See id. at 1426.
62. Polyploid refers to an organism with more than two sets of chromosomes. See Kambic, supra note 25, at 453 n.115. Humans have two sets of chromosomes and are referred to as diploid. Id. See generally W. KEEION,
ELEMENTs OF BIoLoGIcAL ScIENcE 528 (1982) for a discussion of polyploid and

diploid organisms.
63. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1425-26. Polyploidy in oysters causes sterility
which not only increases the oysters's size but also makes them edible all year
long. See Kambic, supra note 25, at 453 n.116.
64. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426. Claims 1 and 9 were valid, as they were
drawn to the method of producing polyploid oysters. Id.
65. Id. Claims 8,12,13 and 15 were rejected because they were drawn to the
polyploid oyster itself. Id.
66. Id. The examiner stressed that the oyster was "controlled by the laws
of nature and not a manufacture by man that is patentable." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1426-27. The Board did, however, hold that the claims were appropriately rejected on the alternate ground of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in
view of the prior art. The Board stated that "[i]f the product in a product-byprocess claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim
is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process."
Id at 1427. Therefore, a patent was not issued on Allen's oyster. Id.
69. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1426 (B.P.A.I. 1987).
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made invention cannot be found in nature, then the invention is
patentable subject matter.70 For the first time, the Board had upheld the patentability of a multicellular animal. 71
Based on the Board's ruling in Allen, the PTO formally announced on April 7, 1987, that it would henceforth regard multicellular living organisms as patentable. 72 The following week, the
PTO issued a patent on a genetically altered mouse, the first multicellular animal to be patented in the United States. 73 After this
patent was issued, applications for patents covering all kinds of genetically altered multicellular animals arrived at the PTO faster
than they could be processed. 74
III.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PATENTING OF GENETICALLY
ENGmEERED LIFE-FORMS

A

Ownership of the Offspring of PatentedAnimas

Once an inventor receives a patent for an invention he will, of
course, desire to sell or license the invention to reap the rewards of
his research. 75 However, the sale of living organisms presents novel
issues in the field of patent law. One unanswered question is
70. Id. at 1427 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980)).
71. The patent was not issued on the oyster, however, because of other deficiencies in the application. See supranotes 65 and 68 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the deficiencies in the application.
72. See U.S. to Grant Patents on Animals, WASH. POsT, Apr. 18, 1987, at
A24, col. 1 (quoting memorandum by Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner Donald Quigg). The PTO Commissioner announced that the "Patent and
Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within
the scope of 35 U.S.C. [section] 101." Id.
73. The "Harvard Mouse" patent covered a mouse which had been genetically altered so that it would be born with cancer in its cells. Patent and Trade.
mark Office Issues FirstAnimal Paten DAILY REP. FOR EXEcuTIvES (Apr. 13,
1988). As a result, the mice are exceptionally susceptible to the development of
tumors when exposed to cancer causing agents. Id. The mice can be used by
scientists as a means of testing various chemicals to determine their propensity
to cause cancer. Id.
74. By April 8, 1990, over 7800 patent applications involving genetically engineered life forms were on file. Technology Lets Gene Out ofBottle, Cm. TRIB.,
Apr. 8, 1990, at 1. In 1988, the backlog on patents claiming genetically engineered organism was about 39 months. Speed Bumps, NAT'L. J., May 20,1988, at
1268.
75. The very purpose of the patent laws are to promote the progress of science by providing inventors with exclusive rights as an incentive for their research efforts. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)
(the 17-year monopoly offered by a patent is to encourage disclosure of inventions); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (objective of the
Constitution in granting Congress the power to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to foster scientific research). See supra note 14 and accompanying text for examples of estimates of the value of various drugs made possible
by genetically engineered organisms.
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whether a patent holder maintains any rights in the progeny76 of a
77
patented organism.
Obviously, this is a crucial question to the genetic engineering
companies which produce and patent such organisms, 78 and farmers, who use and breed such organisms. The farmers fear that the
genetic engineering companies, able to infuse enormous sums of
money into research and development, will synthesize new strains
of animals superior to existing farm animals.7 9 If a patent holder is
deemed to maintain rights in the offspring of such superior animals,
the farmers could be prevented from buying one of the superior animals and breeding it for themselves80 The farmers are troubled by
the fact that they will not be able to compete under such conditions
and will be driven out of business.8 1
Any rights which a patent holder has against a third party are
defined in section 271 of the Patent Act.82 This section defines in76. Progeny is defined as "children, descendants, or offspring collectively."
(2d Col. ed. 1978).
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77. Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wis), in discussing the present patent law, stated. "a farmer who obtains a patented animal would likely
also obtain the right to use the animal for the intended use such as milking or
slaughter. It is uncertain, however, whether the farmer would be liable for an
act of patent infringement if the farmer reproduced the patented animal." 134
CONG. REc. H7436 (1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
78. Genetic engineering research requires the investment of enormous

sums of money. In April 1990, Monsanto opened a spacious $200 million Life

Sciences Research Center in St. Louis. Technology Lets Gene Out of Bottle, CHL
Tm., Apr. 8, 1990, at 1. The new facility is devoted exclusively to the development of genetically engineered crops and farm animals. Id
The genetic engineering companies are willing to invest large amounts of
money because the potential markets are immense. For example, this country
alone has a beef industry of $30 billion annually and a dairy industry of $18
billion annually. Cattle-CloningLabs Transform the Barnyard,CmI. TRiB., Apr.
10,1990, at 1. The genetic engineering companies would understandably wish to
monopolize the market on pigs that produce lean pork, cows that give skim
milk, chickens that lay low cholesterol eggs, etc.
79. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 470.
80. Generations of Profits: Firms Seek Royalties for Patented Animals,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1989, at 62. Farmers would have to "pay suppliers royalties
on a cow's calves ... generation after generation." Id. (quoting Michael Cannell, dairy farmer and political activist).
81. Czarnetzky, supra note 10, at 1328 n.5. See also Kambic, supra note 25,
at 455; Generations Of Profits: Firms Seek Royalties for Patented Animals,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1989, at 62 (improvements in biotechnology will hurt the
small farmer); House Panel HearsTestimony Addressing Animal PatentingIssues, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 25, 1989, at A-6. ("without a patent
infringement exemption, the future of the family farmer will be no better than
that of a sharecropper"). But cf. Patents:A CrucialLegislatoris Leaving, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1990, at 32, col. 5 (biotechnology companies vehemently oppose
an infringement exemption for farmers, claiming it would remove all monetary
incentive to develop genetically altered animals).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1990). The infringement section states that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." Id.
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fringement of a patent as any unauthorized use of a patented invention, which includes making, using, or selling the patented
invention.83 The critical words of this section are "without authority." There clearly is no infringement of a patent owner's rights if
his invention is made, used, or sold with his authority. Therefore,
in order to examine a patent holder's rights to the offspring of his
patented organisms, a review of what rights and authorizations are
acquired by a purchaser of such a patented organism must be made.
Currently, there are no court decisions which decide the issue
of ownership of offspring of patented organisms. However, a review of the case law resolving an analogous issue will prove helpful.
The courts have decided that the "repair" of a patented article is
not infringement, while its "reconstruction" is infringement.8 4 By
examining the reasoning behind the decisions in this area of patent
law, we may be able to determine how the present issue will be
resolved.
In American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,s5 a patent holder sold
patented metal straps for use in tying cotton bales.8s The straps
were marked "licensed to use once only."87 In normal use, the
straps were cut to unbind the cotton and then discarded.8 8 The defendant acquired the discarded straps and riveted the ends together.8 9 He then resold them for use, once again, as cotton binding
supplies.9
The Supreme Court found that the defendant had infringed the
patent held by the plaintiff.91 The Court determined that once the
bales of cotton had been transported from the plantation to the mill
the ties were voluntarily cut because they had performed their intended function.92 The Court stressed that the metal bands were
intended to be used only one time, such intent being made clear by
the patentee's marking of the bands.93 The defendant's reconstruction was, therefore, an impermissible violation of the patentee's

rights.

94

Subsequently, in Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill,95 the plaintiff
83. Id

84. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342
(1961).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
Simmons, 106 U.S. at 90.
Id-at 91.
1&
Id
idId-at 95.
I& at 94.
Id.
1&
Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963).
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had patented a tire repair device.96 The device consisted of a hollow
metal tube and a rubber plug which fit into the tube.97 In operation, the plug was fitted into the metal tube and then the tube was
inserted into a puncture in a tire.98 The plug was then pushed out
of the tube as the tube was removed from the tire. The plug was
left in the tire to effect an air-tight seal. 99 The defendant sold a
replacement plug to be used with the device manufactured by the
plaintiff. 10 0
The United States Court of Appeals held that the defendant
was guilty of inducing1 ' infringement of the plaintiff's patented
device. 10 2 In so holding, the court noted that all expectations were
03
that the metal tube would only be used once, then discarded
The court relied heavily on Simmons14 and stated that the decision in that case was still very much applicable as authority. 10 5
In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,1° 6 the
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a defendant had contributorily10

7

infringed the plaintiff's patent by causing impermissible

reconstruction of a patented article."°s The defendant manufactured and sold a substitute material tailored to fit the plaintiff's
patented convertible car top1 ° 9 When the original fabric of the top
96. Thornhill, 315 F.2d at 409. The tire repair device was especially useful
because it facilitated the repair of a tire without dismounting the tire from the
wheel. Id.
97. Id. at 410.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In a patent infringement action, a defendant may be sued for three different types of infringement. 1) direct infringement, 2) inducing infringement,
and 3) contributory infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1990).
The Patent Act defines a direct infringer as someone who, without authority, makes, uses, or sells a patented article. § 271(a).
An inducing infringer is defined by the Patent Act as somebody "who actively induces infringement of a patent." § 271(b).
Finally, a contributory infringer is defined by the Patent Act as someone
who sells "a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent." § 271(c).
102. Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 1963).
103. Thornhill, 315 F.2d at 413.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94 for a discussion of American
Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons.
105. Thornhill, 315 F.2d at 413 n.15.
106. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
107. Aro, 365 U.S. at 341. The Court had to decide whether the defendant's
sales constituted contributory infringement because it had sold only a component of a patented article and had clearly not directed infringement. Id. See
supra note 101 for a discussion of the three different types of infringements.
108. Id. at 342.
109. Id. at 337.
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wore out, consumers replaced the original fabric with the defendant's fabric. 110 The Court held that this replacement was a permissible repair of the top and not an infringing reconstruction.", In so
holding, however, the Court stressed that a patent holder cannot
restrain a purchaser from restoring articles worn by use "unless
they in fact make a new article." 12
From the foregoing discussion of the case law, it is apparent
that ownership of the offspring of a patented organism might rest
with the patent holder because the offspring of the patented animal
is a new animal. Clearly, a purchaser of a patented animal has the
right to "repair" it and to use it. However, under the Aro doctrine," 3 the progeny of the patented animal might be interpreted as
a new article, whose use would infringe the rights of the patent
holder. In light of the Simmons1 4 and Thornhil115 cases, the patent holder might also be able to further his claim of rights to the
progeny of the patented animal if the animal was sold with the express proviso that it not be bred.
However, a strained interpretation of case law is not an appropriate procedure by which the question of the ownership of the offspring of patented organisms should be resolved. Too much
depends upon a just and proper resolution of the question. What is
needed is legislative guidance.
Congress should amend the Patent Act so as to make the answer to this vexing question clear. The House of Representatives
has recognized the uncertainty of the present patent law.n 6 In
1988, the House passed the Animal Patent Bill." 7 However, the
Senate has not yet passed the bill; therefore, the law on this issue
remains unclear. Among other objectives, section two of this bill
addresses the fears of farmers by including an exemption from patent infringement for farmers" 8 who breed patented farm ani110. Id. at 338.
111. I&i at 346.
112. Id. at 343 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,425 (1945)) (emphasis added). "The patent monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from... reconditioning articles
worn by use, unless they in fact make a new article". Id
113. See supra text accompanying notes 106-112 for a discussion of the Aro
doctrine.
114. American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882). See supra
notes 85-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
115. Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963). See supra

notes 95-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Thornhill case.
116. See supranote 77 for a discussion of the uncertainty facing today's farmers regarding this issue.
117. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H7436 (1988).
118. The Animal Patent Bill proposed to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271 by adding
the following subsection: "(g)(1) It shall not be an act of infringement for a
person whose occupation is farming to reproduce a patented transgenic farm
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mals.11 9 However, the bill would also protect the legitimate
interests of the genetic engineering companies by prohibiting the
sale of the germ cells, semen, or embryos of a patented farm
animal.Mo
Clarification of the patent law on this issue is needed. Legislative action such as the House Animal Patent Bill is suitable because
it balances the protection of our nation's farmers against the interests of the emerging genetic engineering companies. The farmers
will be able to compete in the farming business, and the genetic engineering companies will be able to prevent wholesale infringement
of their patents by people who would buy one patented animal, then
use it to enter the genetic engineering business on their own.
B.

Compliance with the "Enablement"Requirement

21
or a franchise 12 2
A patent has been referred to as a contract
between the government and an inventor. The government grants
the inventor a "monopoly" in return for disclosure to the public of
how to make and use the invention. In addition, the public has the
right to use the invention after the patent expires. The government's demand for an enabling disclosure of the invention was
found in the first Patent Act of 1790.23 The enablement requirement is now found in section 112 of the Patent Act.124 The present

animal through breeding, use such animal in farming operations, or sell such
animal or the offspring of such animal." H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134
CONG. REC. H7436 (1988).
119. The Animal Patent Bill defines a farm animal as any "animal used or
intended for use as food or fiber." Id. The bill defines a transgenic farm animal
as "a farm animal whose germ cells contain genetic material originally derived
from another other than the parent of the farm animal." Id.

120. The Animal Patent Bill further proposed to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271 by
adding the following language: "(g)(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), [exemption from infringement for farmers] it shall be an act of infringement for a person to sell the germ cells, semen, or embryos of a patented
transgenic farm animaL" Id.
121. Century Electric Co. v. Westinghouse, 191 F. 350 (8th Cir. 1911).
122. Seymore v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871).
123. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-376 (1990)). The Act provided in part that the specification must "enable a
workman or other person skilled in the art of manufacture, whereof it is a
branch... to make, construct or use the same, to the end that the public may
have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term." Id.
The purpose of the enabling disclosure was elucidated by the Supreme
Court in the case of Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832). The Court stated
that an enabling disclosure "is necessary in order to give the public, after the
privilege [the inventor's monopoly] shall expire, the advantage for which the
privilege is allowed and is the foundation of the power to issue the patent".
Raymond, 31 U.S. at 247.
124. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). This section of the Act stipulates that the specification must include a written description of the invention and "of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
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Patent Act not only requires the inventor to provide an enablingm
disclosure, but the Act also demands that the inventor specify the
"best mode" of making and using the invention. 2 6 The enablement
requirement is normally met by a written specification. 2 7 However, when living organisms are involved, the written specification
has sometimes proved inadequate. To address this inadequacy, the
PTO has developed the deposit requirement.
The deposit requirement is a nonstatutory means of compelling
inventors to comply with the enablement requirement of section
112. Before patents for genetically engineered organisms were accepted by the PTO, the procedure for determining when a deposit
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make and
use the same." IcL
125. The word "enabling" means that one skilled in the art to which the
patent pertains can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In re Coleman, 176 U.S.P.Q. 522, 524 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The limits of undue experimentation had been identified by the court in
A.B. Dick Co. v. Barnett, 288 F. 799 (2d Cir. 1923). The court explained that the
apparatus disclosed in an application need not necessarily be operative in the
exact form in which it is shown and described. It is sufficient if it can be rendered operative by adjustments and corrections which would naturally occur to
a skilled worker in the art..." Id at 799. See also Bennett v. Halahan, 285 F.2d
807 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (an apparatus is deemed disclosed in a patent if it is sufficiently described to allow one skilled in the art to practice the invention by
making adjustments); Creed v. Potts, 96 F.2d 317 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (invention disclosure will not be held inoperative if a skilled mechanic could render it operative); Trumbull v. Kirschbraun, 67 F.2d 974 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (if :ne skilled in
the art is able to practice the patented invention then it is sufficiently

disclosed).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). The Act states that the specification must "set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor in carrying out his invention." Id
This best mode requirement is based on the subjective knowledge of the
inventor at the time the application was filed. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (C.A.F.C. 1983). "Section 112 requires that the inventor set forth the best mode of practicing the invention known to him at the
time the application was filed." Garlock, 721 F.2d at 1540. See also Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 488 F.2d 382, 388 (1st Cir. 1973) (failure
by inventor to disclose specific materials necessary to practice patent will invalidate patent); Application of Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1233 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (the purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from concealing
preferred embodiments of their inventions, citing Application of Gay, 309 F.2d
769 (C.C.P.A. 1952)); Benger Laboratories, Ltd. v. R. Loaros Co., 209 F.Supp.
639, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1962) aff'd per curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963) (failure to
disclose better method of practicing an invention will not invalidate a patent so
long as the better method was not thrown to the inventor).
However, courts have not required the mode disclosed by the inventor to in
fact be the optimum mode of carrying out the invention as long as the inventor
did not know of the better mode. Application of Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 773 (C.C.P.A.
1952). The court required only a good faith attempt by the inventor to disclose
the best mode. Id at 772. See also Benger Laboratories,317 F.2d at 456 (inventor
must have made no attempt to conceal what he thought was the best method of
using the invention).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). This section requires that "the specification shall
contain a written description of the invention." Id
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was required on a biotechnological invention 2s was straightforward. If the living organism involved in the patent was known by,
and available to,129 the public,13° a deposit was not necessary and a
patent would be granted.' 31 However, if the organism was new and
132
unavailable to the public, a deposit was mandatory.
However, the terms "unknown" and "unavailable" are deceptive because the statute requires any patentable invention to be
"new" 133 and not "known or used by others."'134 The PTO utilized
the terms to identify naturally occurring microorganisms wherein
an adequate explanation of how to acquire the microorganism from
nature could not be put into words.1as The PTO's application of the
deposit requirement to non-genetically engineered organisms is a
128. Examples of biotechnological inventions that do not involve genetic engineering include process patents employing living organisms and cell lines that
have been purified through selective breeding.
129. See Feldman v. Aunstrup, 186 U.S.P.Q. 108, 111 (C.C.P.A. 1975), cert
denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976) (there is no enablement problem when the microorganisms used are known and readily available to the public); In re Interference
A v. B v. C, 159 U.S.P.Q. 538, 540 (Commr. PTO 1967) (inventor is not required
to teach in his specification how to make or procure known materials and ingredients); Merck & Co. v. Chase Chemical Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 139 (D. N.J. 1967)

(inventor's failure to deposit starting materials in a public depository is not fatal
to the application so long as the materials are readily available to persons
skilled in the art).
130. When analyzing the sufficiency of the enablement disclosure, the term
public does not mean the general public, but rather those skilled in the art. See
In re Storrs, 114 U.S.P.Q. 293,296 (C.C.P-. 1957) (patents are written to enable
those skilled in the art to practice the invention); A.B. Dick Co. v. Barnett, 288
F. 799, 799 (2d Cir. 1923) ("the specification of a patent is not addressed to people who are ignorant about the subject matter...").
131. The patent would be granted, of course, only if the other provisions of
the Patent Act were complied with. See supra note 15 and accompanying text
for the provisions of the Patent Act.
132. Feldman, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 108. "No problem exists when the microorganisms used are known and readily available to the public. When the invention
depends on the use of a microorganism which is not so readily available, applicants must take additional steps to comply with the requirements of section
112." Id. at 11. See also In re Argoudelis, 168 U.S.P.Q. 99 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(when microorganisms are used as starting materials, it is impossible to give a
sufficient description of how to obtain the microorganism from nature); Ex
parte Schmidt-Kastner & Hackman, 153 U.S.P.Q. 473, 474 (PTO Bd. App. 1963)
(effect of deposit used as a description of a living starting material is similar to a
reference to an earlier patent application); Exparte Kropp, 143 U.S.P.Q. 148,152
(PTO Bd. App. 1959) (an organism used as a starting material unquestionably
can not be duplicated from a written description).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
134. § 102. This section of the Patent Act defines novelty as an unknown or
unused invention: "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent - unless (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country" before the date of invention by the applicant. Id
135. In re Argoudelis, 168 U.S.P.Q. 99, 102 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The terms "unknown and unavailable" are used to describe naturally occurring microorganisms wherein "[a] sufficient description of how to obtain the microorganism
from nature cannot be given." Id.
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workable solution to the problem of non-enabling disclosures. The
deposit is needed because our knowledge is not sufficient to fully
describe the anatomic and metabolic properties of complex, naturally occurring organisms. 136
However, present PTO procedures will not suffice in the genetic engineering age. In contrast to the production of naturally
occurring organisms, modification of organisms through genetic engineering can often be performed by using starting materials and
techniques which are available to those skilled in the art. L3 7 Therefore, even though the modified organism is novel and unavailable,
the written disclosure can describe the invention sufficiently to
comply with the enablement requirement. 3 8 When such a disclosure is possible, the considerations warranting a deposit no longer
endure.
The procedure employed by the PTO to determine whether to
require a deposit in a particular case should be modified. The inquiry should no longer center on whether the organism is "unknown and unavailable" because: (1) these terms are misnomers as
applied to patentable inventions, and (2) many genetically engineered organisms, unlike naturally occurring organisms, can be described by the written word. Rather than blindly mandate deposit
of biological inventions, the PTO should inquire as to whether a
disclosure is sufficient, absent a deposit. Such an analysis would
avoid unnecessary and wasteful deposits of genetically engineered
organisms whose production can adequately be disclosed by a written specification.
C

ConstitutionalRight of Privacy Issue Raised by the Patenting
of GeneticallyAltered Human Beings

While the initial manipulation of the genes of a human being
will likely come about on an embryo with a hereditary disease, 39
136. See Hampar, supra note 13, at 580.

137. See Virginia H. Mayer, Problems and Issues in Depositing Microorganismsfor PatentPurposes,65 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y. 455,459 (1983) (it is conceivable that sufficient information can be contained in the written disclosure to
allow one skilled in the art to reproduce the invention if he has the starting
materials); John E. Schneider, Microorganismsand the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not to Deposit, That Is the Question, 52 FoRDHAM L. REV. 592, 600
(1984) (by employing recombinant DNA technology an inventor can develop a
new living entity and sufficiently describe how it is done so that others can
realize the same result by following the specification).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). See supra note 124 for the text of the enablement

requirement.
139. HaroldM. Schmeck, Gene Altered Animals EnterNew CommercialEra,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1988, at C19, col. 6. Manipulation of an embryo's genes is
known as prenatal gene therapy. See DeBre, supra note 3, at 226 n.32 (citing
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE
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we have much more to learn before this would become technically
feasible. 140 However, technology will advance, and eventually our
scientists will be capable of manipulating the genetic make-up of
human beings.14 1 Inventors will then be in a position to develop
human inventions. 14
Even though an inventor's ownership of patent rights in an
original human gene would not infringe the Thirteenth Amendment 143 protection 44 of those bearing the patented genetic mateSOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENEIC ENGINEERING WITH HuMAN BmNGS 45-

46 (1982)). Prenatal gene therapy is a method of altering or replacing particular

genes in every cell of an organism. Ic. Performance of gene therapy on an
embryo would encompass insertion of the selected gene into the mature ovum
removed from the woman. Id, The egg is then fertilized in vitro, and reinserted
into the woman's uterus. Id. By using this technique, doctors will be able to
remedy genetic defects which cause diseases such as cystic fibrosis. Id.
In contrast to prenatal gene therapy, post natal gene therapy is implemented on a fully developed child or adult. Id at n.33. This type of treatment
consists of a change of genetic material within a single tissue. Id. The tissue is
removed from the person's body, the "bad" genes are replaced with new genes,
and the tissue is reinserted. Id. Such surgery is used to correct existing genetic
defects. Id.
140. Kass, Babies by Means of in Vitro Fertilization:UnethicalExperiments
on the Unborn?,285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174 (1971) (experiments performed on
the unborn present possibilities of inadvertent genetic deformations); Scbmeck,
supra note 139, at C10, col. 6. Before corrective surgery would become feasible,
however, experimentation would obviously have to be carried out. For a discussion regarding genetic experimentation on human beings see Marilyn J. Clapp,
Note, State Prohibitionof Fetal Experimentation and the FundamentalRight
to Privacy,88 COLum. L. REv. 1073 (1988) (arguing that laws preventing genetic
experimentation unconstitutionally conflict with a couple's right to privacy in
reproductive decisions).
141. The entire human genome (collection of genes) is composed of about
100,000 genes. David Fishlock, Biotechnology: Its All in the Genes, FIN. TIms,
May 12,1989, at 19. So far the functions of just a few thousand have been identified. Id. It is estimated that the entire mapping process will take 15 years. Id.
In 1989, the United States government initiated a $3 billion dollar research project to map the entire human genome. Technology Lets Gene Out of the Bottle,
CM. TRM., April 8, 1990, at 1.
After the mapping process is complete, scientists will then be able to develop procedures for the manipulation of human genes. Once gene manipulation is possible, scientists will be able to produce human/animal hybrids. Such
hybrids might conceivably be developed through the merging of human genetic
materials with that of a lower animal. DeBre, supra note 3, at 227. Additionally, scientists might manipulate the genetic make-up of a human in order to
produce a person with desired impairments, such as lower intelligence, or an
obedient personality. Id142. For the purpose of this comment the term "human invention" means an
invention incorporating a human genotype that meets the statutory patent requirements, and which manifests a distinct trait, regardless of whether it is
observable.
143. U. S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." Id.
144. April 7, 1987, the PTO stated that "[a] claim directed to or including
within its scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable... [be-
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rial, other constitutional issues will arise from the application of the
Patent Act to human inventions.
cause the] grant of a limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is
prohibited by the Constitution." Patentsand the Constitution:TransgenicAnimals:Hearings efore Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Libertiesand the Administration of Justice, 100 Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987) (statement of Commissioner
Donald Quigg). The PTO did not specify which provision of the Constitution it
relied upon, but commentators suggest that the Office's constitutional foundation was the Thirteenth Amendment. LEGAL TIMEs, June 15, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
However, the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit the patenting of
human inventions. The Thirteenth Amendment was enacted solely for the purpose of "establish[ing] the freedom of four million slaves". G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 408 (11th ed. 1985) (quoting Slaughter-House cases, 77 U.S. 273
(1869))). The one purpose of the post-Civil War amendments (13th, 14th, and
15th) was to be the "freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him." Id.
To carry out the emancipation of the slaves, Congress was given expansive
enforcement power. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation"). See also Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Congress has authority to "pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States").
Congress then utilized this power to pass laws to effectuate nationwide emancipation and to prohibit exploitation of one person by another.
The courts have had numerous occasions to apply the protections afforded
by the Thirteenth Amendment. For examples of when the Thirteenth Amendment has been liberally utilized to prohibit threats of legal confinement and
acts short of forced labor, see United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (involuntary servitude includes psychological
compulsion to subjugate another's will); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095,
1100 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983) ("threat of violence or confinement, backed sufficiently by deeds" qualifies as subjugation of another's will in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Tibbs, 564 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978) (finding of involuntary servitude can result if victim's fear of physical harm prevents him from leaving);
Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944) (intimidation of women into
acts of prostitution prohibited by anti-slavery statute). Nonetheless, even a
broad reading of the Thirteenth Amendment only prohibits "conditions that
could reasonably be called symptoms of a slave society, inability to raise a family with dignity caused by unemployment, poor schools and housing, and a lack
of place in the body politic." Note, Jones v. Mayer. The Thirteenth Amendment
and the Federal Anti-DiscriminationLaws, 69 COLUm L. REv. 1019, 1026
(1969).
After reviewing the purpose behind the Thirteenth Amendment, it is manifest that the patenting of the genes of a human being exhibiting novel traits
does not raise a problem of slavery. An inventor holding a patent on a new
human gene would have an exclusive right to practice the patent, that is, he
would be the only person who could make, use, or sell the patented gene. 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1990). However, the patent would not grant the inventor a possessory right in the patented article. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 474 n.122. An
inventor who owns a patent on a particular human gene is not in the position to
"enslave" another person, or to subrogate his will. Id. Rather, the inventor can
simply prohibit others from making an organism with that genetic make-up. Id
Therefore, it is not likely that one would have much success in governing the
patenting of human beings by resorting to the Thirteenth Amendment. Id-
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Violations of ConstitutionallyProtectedRight of Privacy

The Patent Act specifies that an inventor must provide a written description of his invention. 45 This description, in the case of a
patented human gene, would require disclosure of the novel genetic
traits possessed by the human being. Such public disclosure of a
person's genetic make-up can be interpreted as an infringement of a
146
person's constitutionally protected right of privacy.
The right of privacy includes the prerogative to release or to
withhold any and all private facts. 147 The sanctity of an individual's
right to privacy is protected by a plethora of federal and state laws
which regulate the storage and dissemination of information by
governmental agencies.148 Additionally, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a person's right of privacy might need to be pro149
tected by regulation of the disclosure of private information.
Whether a violation of the right of privacy of a person bearing a
patented gene would result from the patent disclosure has yet to be
adjudicated. However, in light of the weight the Supreme Court
has placed on privacy,'50 it is possible that such a violation will be
145. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). See supra note 125 and accompanying text for a

discussion of the written descriptions required.
146. See DeBre, supra note 3, at 240. While it is true that a patent description would not distinguish an individual by name, the individual would nevertheless be recognizable if the patented trait was distinctive, i.e., blue skin. Id.
147. See Charles Fried, Privacy,77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
148. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (authorization required for
disclosure of individual records); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a) (1973) (governs disclosure of medical, psychological and scholastic achievement records in
public schools); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.7(10)-(11) (West 1973) (governs dissemination of information in the records of public employees).
149. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (invalidating law that required
doctors to disclose the names of patients who receive particular drugs). But see
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (suspect's right of privacy was not violated by
police disclosure of shoplifting arrest).
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decision to terminate pregnancy is protected by right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right of privacy extends to contraceptive use); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (First Amendment rights include the freedom
to associate and the right to privacy in such associations); Beard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951) (right of privacy extends to the right to be undisturbed by
doorbell ringing of solicitors); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (right of privacy regarding religious belief).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's determination that a constitutionally protected right of privacy derives from a penumbra formed by the various
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, see generally Robert G. Dixon Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: ConstitutionalCharterFor an ExpandedLaw of Privacy?, 64
MicH. L. REv. 197,206 (1965) (lists cases recognizing a right to privacy); Thomas
I. Emerson, Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine,64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 228
(1965) (right of privacy formed by protections of the first, third, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments); Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamentaland Things Forgotten:The GriswoldCase, 64 MxcH.
L. REV. 135 (1965) (same); Robert B. McKay, The Right of Privacy:Emanations
and Imitations,64 McH. L. REV. 259 (1965) (same).
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found. 15 ' Congress should recognize the potential uncertainty and
act to clarify the law. An amendment to the Patent Act providing
controlled disclosure of human genetic information is appropriate.
An exception to the unlimited disclosure mandated by the Patent Act could be modeled after an exception found in the Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA"). 152 The FOIA controls dissemination
of government-held information.- 53 The exception found in the
FOIA provides that the disclosure of medical information may be
withheld if such disclosure would result in an unjustifiable invasion
of privacy.' 54 A Patent Act exception would likewise direct withholding information concerning an individual's patented genetic
make-up if the disclosure was unjustified.' - Of course, at times,
disclosure of the information will be justified because the person
requesting the information has a legitimate scientific need. For
such instances, the proposed amendment would provide for a procedure whereby a request would be made to the Commissioner of Patents, and a decision could be rendered regarding the justification of
disclosure versus an individual's interest in maintaining confidentiality.156 Such a modification to the Patent Act would protect an
individual's right of privacy while still meeting the objectives of the
patent system, i.e., fostering scientific progress.
151. See generally Tyler Baker, Note, Roe and Paris:Does PrivacyHave a

Principle?,26 STAN. L. REv. 1160, 1163 (1973) ("right of selective disclosure" is
one aspect of privacy). Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity:An Answer to DeanProsser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964) (privacy is an

aspect of human dignity rather than merely an interest in property or reputation); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Comment, The Griswold Penumbra.Constitutional
Charterforan Expanded Law of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197,205 (1965) (the

right of privacy encompasses not only the right to solitude, but also the right to
secrecy); Comment, Genetic Engineeringand the Right of Privacy, 21 L. TECH.

20, 22 (1988) (right of privacy incorporates right of control over disclosure of
personal matters).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1990).
153. I&

154. Ic- at § 552(b)(6). This section states that the broad disclosures mandated by the FOIA do not apply to matters which involve "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". Id.
155. An appropriate exception to the disclosure of patent information which
would violate a person's right of privacy would be added to the Patent Act after
section 154, which defines the contents of an issued patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
The amendment would read as follows:
154A (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 154, the descriptive
disclosures of patents covering genetically altered human material shall not
be made available to any persons unless good cause is shown otherwise.
Good cause shall include a legitimate scientific need for disclosure.
(b) Any persons requesting such information shall describe their need
for such information to the Commissioner of Patents. The Commissioner,
in deciding whether to release the information, shall weigh the interests of
privacy against the scientific need for disclosure.
156. See supra note 155 for the text of the proposed amendment.
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CONCLUSION

The debate over whether genetically altered higher life-forms
are patentable subject matter is over. In Ex parte Allen, 157 the
court answered the question in the affirmative. 5 8 Shortly thereafter, the PTO responded by granting a patent on a genetically altered mouse.159 However, the law governing the patenting of
genetically altered organisms is far from settled.
One controversy is whether a patent holder who sells a patented animal maintains rights in the animal's offspring. The Patent
Act is silent on this issue. Its resolution depends upon the balancing of competing interests. One of these interests is that of our
country's farmers. They seek to maintain competitiveness in the
marketplace. 160 A competing interest is the interest of the biotechnology companies which invest heavily in research. 161 They invest
with the expectation of receiving monopolies on their patented inventions.162 Congress must address the issue and reach a consensus
as to the degree of protection each of these competing interests
should receive. A compromise, as drafted by the House of Representatives, is an appropriate measure.163 Once Congress has
reached a consensus, the Patent Act can be amended in order for
the law to clearly reflect Congress' intentions.
A second issue involving the patenting of genetically engineered animals is whether the present PTO procedures are adequate to deal with the new technology. The PTO has developed the
deposit requirement as a means of compelling enablement of patents claiming living organisms. 164 Present PTO procedures would
require a deposit by all inventors who claim genetically engineered
organisms. However, deposit by all inventors of genetically engineered organisms is not necessary.
When deciding whether to require a deposit for a particular
patent, the PTO should shift its inquiry from: "is the organism 'unknown' and 'unavailable'?" to "is the organism capable of adequate
157. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245 (B.P.A.I. 1987). See supra notes 60-74

and accompanying text for a discussion of Allen.
158. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426-27.
159. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"Harvard Mouse."
160. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of a farmers' interests exemption from infringement in order to remain competitive.

161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of investments
by biotechnology companies.
162. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expectations of investors.
163. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
House of Representations proposed amendment to the Patent Act.
164. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
PTO deposit requirements.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:119

disclosure absent a deposit?". This new analysis will allow those
genetically engineered organisms which have simple starting
materials, and which can be disclosed sufficiently without a deposit,
to be so disclosed. This approach will ensure adequate disclosure of
genetically engineered organisms without being overinclusive by requiring deposits when they are not necessary to comply with the
Patent Act.
A third issue raised by the patentability of genetically engineered life-forms involves the consequences of a patent covering a
genetically engineered human invention. The Patent Act requires
an inventor to disclose what his invention is, and how to make and
use it.'65 However, the disclosure of the novel traits of a patented
human gene might be an unconstitutional violation of the right of
privacy of the person bearing that gene. Congress must address this
issue by amending the Patent Act to provide for limited disclosure
of human genetic information.
The proposed amendment' 66 is modeled after an exception in
the FOIA which prohibits disclosure of medical information if the
disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of privacy.' 6 7 The
proposed amendment would allow for a case-by-case balancing of
priorities between an individual's interest in maintaining confidentiality and a researcher's need for the information. Congress must
pass such legislation so that the potential for an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy resulting from a patent will not have a chilling
effect upon genetic research. Scientists and engineers must be free
to wholeheartedly continue their research into human genetics so
that humanity may reap the benefits.'68
Matthew B. Trapper

165. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1990). See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text
for a discussion of description and enablement requirements.
166. See supra note 155 for the text of the proposed amendment.

167. See supra note 154 and accompanying text discussing the FOIA exception for personal information.

-

168. In September, 1990, a highly experimental trial of a new gene therapy
was initiated. Verma, Gene Therapy, SCI. AM., Nov. 1990, at 68. The gene was
introduced into children impaired with a condition known as severe combined
immunodeficiency. Id. The results are being watched very closely because the
experiment marks the beginning of clinical testing of human gene therapy. Id
The benefits of such gene therapy might prove to be immeasurable, because one
out every hundred infants is born with a serious genetic defect. Id.

